Past disciplinary findings

Mr Gabriele Giambrone a registered barrister on or around 22 June 2021 made a Call Declaration that was false in a material respect in that it answered “no” to the question “Are there any other matters which might reasonably be thought to call into question your fitness to become a practising barrister? This includes but is not limited to civil injunctions or criminal orders”. The said answer was false in a material respect in that the following facts and matters existed and might reasonably be thought to call into question his fitness to become a practising barrister:

(a) The High Court of England and Wales had handed down judgments that contained the findings and comments about Mr Giambrone set out in paragraphs (a)-(g) and (k)-(o) of Part A of the attached Annex (or any of the);

(b) That on or about 28 February 2013 and/or 8 March 2013 the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland had made or continued a freezing injunction against the personal assets of Mr Giambrone;


(c) On or about 22 March 2013 the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland refused to vary or discharge a freezing injunction then in place against the personal assets of Mr Giambrone, such that the said injunction remined in place against Mr Giambrone until a date unknown; and/or

(d) The judgment of the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland following the decision of 22 March 2013 contained the findings and comments about Mr Giambrone and his actions set out in Part B of the attached Annex, and/or the substance of such findings/comments.

Mr Gabriele Giambrone a registered barrister on or around 22 June 2021 made a Call Declaration that was false in a material respect in that it answered “no” to the question “Are there any other matters which might reasonably be thought to call into question your fitness to become a practising barrister? This includes but is not limited to civil injunctions or criminal orders”. The said answer was false in a material respect in that

(a) Mr Giambrone had breached an order of the High Court of England and Wales dated 4 February 2015 requiring him to pay sums in respect of costs by 18 February 2015 by not paying the amount ordered or any part of it until a date unknown but after 17 November 2015 as further particularised in paragraph (h) of Part A of the attached Annex; and/or

(b) Foskett J had made the comments set out in paragraph (h) of Part A of the attached Annex in the case of Various Claimants v Giambrone & Law (a firm) & Ors [2015] EWHC 3315 (QB) in respect of the same.

Mr Gabriele Giambrone a registered barrister, engaged before call in conduct which was discreditable to a barrister and which was not, before call fairly disclosed in writing to Lincoln’s Inn, namely:

(a) in or about February/March 2013 posting a comment on Facebook in the following terms, referring to the Plaintiffs in a claim against him brought in the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland: “They thought they knocked me down, now they will see the full scale of my reaction. F*** them, just f*** them. They will be left with nothing.” The said post reasonably caused the said Plaintiffs to apprehend, and/or the High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland to conclude on or about 22 March 2013, that Mr Giambrone was at risk of dissipating his assets and/or seeking to frustrate any judgment that may be made on the said claim;

Mr Gabriele Giambrone a registered barrister, engaged before call in conduct which was discreditable to a barrister and which was not, before call fairly disclosed in writing to Lincoln’s Inn, namely breaching, deliberately or otherwise, an order of the High Court of England and Wales dated 4 February 2015 requiring him to pay sums in respect of costs by 18 February 2015, by not paying the amount ordered or any part of it until a date unknown but after 17 November 2015, as particularised in paragraph (h) of Part A of the attached Annex.

Annex Part A Various Claimants v Giambrone & Law (a firm) & Ors [2015] EWHC 1946 (QB) (Foskett J)
Adverse comments as to the credibility of Mr Giambrone as a witness
(a) “Avvocato Giambrone was often keen to set the agenda for his questioning rather than focusing on and answering directly the questions posed to him. His answers were often lengthy and expressed quickly. Throughout I felt that he was a witness for whom some credible supporting evidence was required before I could safely accept what he said. It will thus be apparent that I have approached everything he has said with a significant degree of caution.” (at [20])

(b) “I have already mentioned the difficulty of assessing this kind of evidence (see paragraph 17) and because of my reservations about the reliability of a fair amount of what Avvocato Giambrone says I approach it with considerable caution.” (at [369])

(c) “I repeat what I have said on a number of occasions about the weight I can give to the suggestion that Avvocato Giambrone's evidence was “unchallenged”. This was another very broad piece of evidence that was entirely self-serving. Without some independent support, preferably reliable documentary support, I would attach little, if any, reliance upon it.” (at [385])
Concealment of the date of Mr Giambrone’s knowledge of the terms of certain Mandates
(d) “237. A personal letter from Avvocato Giambrone dated 29 April 2009 was sent to all proposed purchasers of properties within the JoTS development.
238. The claimants point to a number of passages in this letter as being of significance, one in particular containing, it is said, a highly material disclosure concerning VFI's commission not previously made. I will quote the relevant passage:
“The relationship between VFI (The Promoter) and RDV Development (The Builder)
I am aware that you may have received certain confusing emails from both companies and I feel it is important to clearly define the roles of the parties named in the Preliminary Contract.

When the project was initially marketed, VFI was granted a Mandate agreement by RDV Development (an Italian limited company which owns the land and is constructing the development). This Mandate agreement allowed VFI to market Jewel of the Sea Resort on behalf of RDV Development to the foreign market. In consideration of this marketing and after sales activities, I understand that VFI has been paid a commission of approximately 31% of the purchase price of your property . This means that for a property sold by VFI for €100,000, the average buyer was asked to pay a 50% deposit (€50,000) of which €31,000 was paid to VFI and the difference (€19,000) was utilised by RDV to finance the build.
This information is crucial to understand the reasons why the commercial relationship between RDV and VFI has irretrievably broken down.
We were copied in to a letter sent from RDV to VFI by registered post on 18 March 2009 in which RDV cancelled the Mandate agreement for VFI. As a result, VFI are no longer authorised to act on behalf of RDV or to make any representations in relation to Jewel of the Sea because the power to act on behalf of the builders has been revoked. In plain English this means that VFI are not authorised to contact you in relation to your purchase in Jewel of the Sea nor to promote an After Sales Service of any sort.
Whilst we understand that VFI is named in your preliminary sale agreement, please rest assured that this revoked Mandate agreement does not affect your purchase.
You will appreciate that as your representatives, we are not privy to the specific reasons as to why this Mandate was revoked: however, I understand that the disagreement started by virtue of the level of commissions earned by VFI and because of the difference of opinion as to which party was responsible to provide an extension of the expired Bank Loan Guarantees.
There are conflicting opinions as to VFI's official role in these transactions and it is apparent that the boundary between the definition of their role as “Real Estate Agent” and “Promoter/Marketing consultant” has become blurred. In Italy the role of an (sic) “Real Estate Agent” is a heavily regulated profession and the commissions that agents can charge are limited by law.
It is possible that the commissions received by VFI are contrary to the provisions of the Italian Civil Code which states that (a) any company acting as an estate agent or an intermediary in real estate transactions must be registered with the Chamber of Commerce in the register of “estate agents” and (b) commissions chargeable to a developer cannot exceed a reasonable value of say 6%.

31 % is, in my opinion, an unreasonable figure and, for this reason, I understand that RDV has or intends to put VFI on notice that civil proceedings will be issued to recover the excess commission: this is a matter entirely between VFI and RDV, and a Judge will decide if the dispute proceeds to trial. This will not affect your purchase.
To prove our independence and impartiality from both RDV and VFI, I can confirm that VFI is represented by Studio Legale Metta in Bari whereas RDV is represented by Avv.
Romolo in Reggio Calabria.
….
The relationship between VFI and Giambrone Law
…
In my opinion, VFI has had disagreements with different building companies in Calabria with regards to the non-payment of commissions for some property purchases. Due to the sheer amount of transactions over a limited period of time, there are still reconciliation issues as some funds have been allocated to wrong purchasers in error, thus bringing more confusion into this equation.”
I would like to reassure you that the Client accounts of our law firm have been audited by independent Chartered Accountants and all transactions related to our clients' funds are supplied to our auditors.
….”
[All emphasis as in original].
239. The letter went on to deal with “the completion procedure”, the relevant part of which was as follows:
“I am due to meet with Mr Cuppari (the owner of RDV) and the Notary who has been appointed to execute the Public Deeds of Sale … by the end of May/early June in order to:
(a) discuss the progress of construction works;

(b) create a realistic timetable for completions, considering that Sapphire will be due to complete from late June 2009;

(c) formally appoint our firm to coordinate all completions within Jewel of the Sea (whether our clients or not) in order to avoid confusion between buyers of several nationalities.
Clearly the task ahead is very challenging for all of us, because it will be very difficult to arrange more than 600 completions in such a short time-frame (July-December 2009 for Phase 1) considering that buyers in Jewel of the Sea are of various nationalities.
For this reason, Mr Cuppari and the Notary have indicated that they would prefer to delegate the task of coordinating completions to one law firm only: I also plan to open a temporary satellite office in Brancaleone during the completion period so that our attorneys will be at hand to act on your behalf to execute the Final Deed of Purchase before [the Notary].”
240. Finally, for this purpose, what was said about the bank loan guarantees is of importance:
“As many of our clients are aware, the majority of the bank guarantees initially issued by RDV Developments have expired towards the end of last year.
Giambrone Law contacted the vendors (RDV and VFI) one month prior to the expiration date, in order to remind them of their obligation to provide the guarantee for the entire duration of the Preliminary Contract.
I would also urge you to consider that estate agents have a vested interest in your purchase because they get paid hefty commissions only if you buy the property: as usual, it is important to exercise caution when following the advice of an estate agent bearing in mind their evident conflict-of-interest.
…
241. As indicated above, there are a number of aspects of this to which the claimants draw attention, but I will focus for present purposes on those passages concerning VFI's commission. It is argued that the passage “I understand that VFI has been paid a commission of approximately 31% of the purchase price of your property ” (with the underlining in the original) was a deliberate attempt to suggest that Giambrone Law had only recently learned that VFI had been paid commission at this rate, the words “I understand” seeking to convey that meaning. As will be apparent from paragraph 138 above (and as Avvocato Giambrone accepted when giving evidence), he and his colleagues knew the level of the commission payable to VFI from no later than March 2007.
251…I am quite certain [Mr Giambrone] he would have chosen his words carefully and, given his close interest in the whole JoTS business (particularly in this very intense period in 2009 when the firm was coming under increasing pressure), I cannot believe that he would have let anything go out from the firm that did not have his express approval. I am quite sure that the intention at this time in 2009 was to suggest to the clients of the firm that the firm had only recently discovered the level of commissions paid to VFI. All attempts to suggest that the letters meant something else are, in my view, attempts to rewrite an inconvenient part of the history.”
(e) “375. As has already been indicated (see paragraphs 257 — 263), I am satisfied that the firm realised by no later than April 2009 (if, which I doubt, it had not realised before) that it should have told the claimants at the outset about this division. This could be the only explanation for the pretence maintained in about April/May 2009 (because pretence is what it was) that it had only recently discovered that the level of commission received by VFI was as it was then acknowledged to be.”

(f) “459. However, as I perceive it, the substantive claim made by the claimants arising on the basis of the Mandates is the knowledge they demonstrate that the firm had at the outset about the levels of commission. The claim advanced is that, in breach of duty, the firm failed to reveal it to the individual claimants prior to signing the preliminary contract. That claim could only be advanced when a claimant knew or ought reasonably to have known the fact that the firm knew about this at that stage. The short point is that it is clear that the firm knew about this at the outset, but did not reveal it to the claimants, and the letter of 29 April 2009, which revealed the level of the commission, contained the pretence that the firm had only recently discovered it. It was only when the Mandates themselves were revealed that any claimant would have had grounds for alleging that the firm had knowledge of this from the outset. Whilst it would be right to say that the Mandates provided the evidence for this, they also afforded the fact relevant to the right of action that the claimant would wish to advance. Section 32(1)(b) of the Limitation Act 1980 provides, of course, that where “any fact relevant to the plaintiff's right of action has been deliberately concealed from him by the defendant” the period of limitation shall not begin to run until the plaintiff “has discovered the … concealment … or could with reasonable diligence have discovered it.”
460. I have re-read the transcript of Mr Flenley's submissions on this issue and the helpful note prepared by Mr Carpenter, but I am quite unable to see the complications arising in this context that they say exist. Mr Duddridge has drawn my attention to The Kriti Palm case [2006] EWCA Civ 1601 and has submitted that before the claimants could plead a case of breach of duty based either upon the fact of the Mandates and/or upon the contents of the Mandates they needed to be aware of the fact of the Mandates and of their contents. In my judgment, a fundamental fact underlying the cause of action based upon the failure to reveal the commissions was suppressed deliberately on 29 April 2009 and the full truth was not revealed until the Mandates were revealed later. Mr Flenley accepted that if this was my conclusion, it was capable of showing that there was concealment of the fact that the defendants had known earlier what the level of commission was. For my part, I would hold that the limitation period for this cause of action would not commence until a relevant Mandate was revealed to an individual claimant or the individual claimant “could with reasonable diligence have discovered it”. If I was wrong about that, the earliest moment at which this cause of action could arise would have been 29 April 2009 (which, one supposes, might have led some individuals to start asking questions about what the firm truly knew and when). In that event, Mr Flenley accepts that all claims have been brought within time.”
Various Claimants v Giambrone & Law (a firm) & Ors [2015] EWHC 3315 (QB) (Foskett J)
Concealment of the date of Mr Giambrone’s knowledge of the terms of certain Mandates
(g) “41. The deliberate concealment that I found established was that the Defendants knew the level of commission payable to the developers from the outset, but did not tell any of the purchasers and deliberately suppressed that fact in the letter of 29 April 2009: see paragraphs 458-460 of the main judgment. That the firm knew the position from the outset only became known by each purchaser when the Mandates were revealed over the passage of time: see paragraph 68 of the main judgment. (I dealt with the question of whether the level of commission ought to have been revealed by the firm to the purchasers between paragraphs 357-396 of the main judgment.)” (original emphasis)
Breach of a court order (h) “66. I ordered the Defendants to pay 75% of the PM Claimants' costs of the PM Claimants' application dated 29 January 2015 (summarily assessed in the sum of £3000 including VAT) the PM Claimants' costs of the PM Claimants' application for an unless order dated 18 November 2014 (summarily assessed in the sum of £5500 including VAT) and the PM Claimants' costs of the PM Claimants' application for specific disclosure dated 6 October 2014, to be the subject of a detailed assessment if not agreed, with a provision that the Defendants pay £25,000 on account of the said costs. There was, accordingly, an overall liability for the payment of £33,500 within 14 days of that order (in other words, by 18 February).
67. Those sums were not paid and Mr O'Brien's witness statement of 7 July 2015 traces the history (accurately, as far as I can judge) since the time the order was made until then. He alludes to what I said in the main judgment and paragraph 75 is relevant in this context. My understanding is that nothing has been paid under that order despite Avvocato Giambrone's offer to pay £400 per month. I was at one stage under the misapprehension that there was outstanding an application by the individual defendants for an order that they pay by instalments. Had I been asked to make such an order, I would have anticipated the necessity of the Defendants giving disclosure of their personal financial positions and the prospect of their being cross-examined if the claimants had asked for that facility. If it is being maintained on the Defendants' behalf that the court is bound by the terms of the affidavits filed (whether those originally filed or subsequently), I make it plain that I do not regard myself as so bound. I have considerable reservations about the reliability of what the individual defendants have said about aspects of this case (as will be apparent from the main judgment) and I would not, for my part, accept at face value what they say about their respective financial positions until each had been appropriately scrutinised. However, as I understand it, the risk of my requiring steps such as these to be taken has been obviated by the defendants withdrawing their applications for time to pay. Notwithstanding that, nothing has been paid. Each Defendant is, therefore, in breach (and in deliberate breach) of my order.”
Various Claimants v Giambrone & Law (a firm) & Ors [2019] EWHC 34 (QB) (AIG Judgment)
Adverse comments as to the credibility of Mr Giambrone as a witness

(k) “61. For reasons that hardly need spelling out, I approach anything said by Avvocato Giambrone in the context of this case with considerable caution. In my view, he will only say things that are in his own interests and are self-serving at the time he says them and he will put matters in a way that is capable of misleading. I am reinforced in that view by an admission in a recent witness statement that he gave misleading statements in affidavits put before me in 2014 and 2015 (see paragraph 104-106 below).”
(l) “98. Avvocato Giambrone's statement contains allegations of bad faith by Kennedys and AIG in relation to the circumstances in which the HOTS were concluded. In short, he says that at that time he was obliged to find £70,000 to pay the costs order made by the SDT following the disciplinary proceedings. He and Mr Buchan had been in discussion with AIG, through Kennedys, in trying to resolve the amount of a payment to be made to the partners for the time that Mr Buchan and another person had spent in trying to reconstruct the partnership accounts and ledgers so that the partnership could respond to the claims being made. Until Avvocato Giambrone's statement there had been no suggestion that this claim was not justified, the only issue being the amount. Eventually, the sum of £100,000 was agreed, but what Avvocato Giambrone now says, as I understand it, is that this was an arrangement made so that he could discharge the costs order and had nothing to do with reimbursing the partnership for the work done.
99. This is strongly refuted by Ms Shuttleworth and Mr Webster. It forms no part of my remit to decide which version is correct, but I should say that Avvocato Giambrone's account seems far-fetched and not consistent with the contemporaneous documents.”
(m) “104. Despite the conclusions to which I have referred on the material now available, one other factor has emerged that adds support to questioning the reliability of anything Avvocato Giambrone says in the context of this case. In his recent statement he said this:
"In my affidavits of 17 February 2014 and 19 February 2015, I said that the monies to pay both the SDT costs and the balance of costs under the Court of Appeal's order of 3 November 2014 had come from an unsecured loan from a friend. I accept I had not made clear that in fact the monies had come to me indirectly from AIG."
105. What he had said in his affidavit of 17 February 2014 was this:
"In respect of the remaining £11,162.75, I did not have any money to pay that so I borrowed £11,162.75 on an unsecured basis from a friend who is not a defendant in these proceedings. We have no time to formalise the agreement, which is that I will pay him back in full when I can afford to do so."
106. I do not have his affidavit of 19 February 2015 to hand, but it would seem that a similar misrepresentation of the true position was advanced in that affidavit.”
(n) “20. In my view, the Claimants are perfectly entitled to say that, if they so choose, they do not wish to abandon their entitlement to enforce the award against some or all of the individual Defendants. It is not unreasonable, particularly in the case of Avvocato Giambrone, for them to have reservations about the veracity of what has been said about their respective financial positions.” (Appendix 2)

(o) “28… it is a matter for the Claimants to assess that matter and it is not, so far as I can judge, unreasonable for them to take the view they have. It is not unreasonable for them to have real reservations about what appeared in the affidavits of means, particularly the affidavit of Avvocato Giambrone.” (Appendix 2)
Part B
Martin & Ors v Giambrone & Ors (High Court of Justice in Northern Ireland, Queen’s Bench Division – Commercial List, Burgess J, reasons for judgment following decision of 22 March 2013)
(a) “[13] Since the 22nd February 2013 Horner J has ruled that a subsequent Facebook entry by the defendant, who thought the entry was private, but which in the event was available for public viewing, could be admitted in evidence in this matter. Read without comment it makes clear in no uncertain terms that the defendant would stand in the way of any of the plaintiffs in either of the actions. I refer below to the reasons he has since given for the content of this entry and its tone.” …
[27] The court is concerned as to the Facebook entry of the defendant. I acknowledge the contents of his affidavit in which he deals with what he says was his state of mind which, he says, arose from the injunction and its impact including as it did on innocent third parties. In relation to any other assets held by him in the United Kingdom, I have been told that there are none. Nevertheless, for the reasons that I have stated, a shortfall will potentially arise in both action which the plaintiffs will be able to pursue by way of enforcement against the defendant and any free assets he may have in the United Kingdom. I therefore determine that the injunction will continue against the assets of the defendant in the United Kingdom. If, as the defendant says, there are none then the continuation of the injunctions will cause him no difficulty whatsoever. If on the other hand, contrary to his assertions, there are any such assets and he were to seek to dissipate them, he would be in contempt of the order of this court which would carry its own quite separate consequences.”